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1.  Introduction 
 
In addition to health status, the generosity of social security programs is considered to be one 
of the key determinants of retirement decisions. A significant amount of literature concerning the 
relationship between the social security benefits and labor force participation (LFP) of the elderly 
has highlighted the importance of policy reforms in many developed countries. In particular, a 
series of works by Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004, 2007), which are recent examples of cross-
country studies on this issue, reveal that social security incentives have a sizeable effect on 
retirement decisions across countries with different labor market institutions and other social 
characteristics. In recent years, Japan has also experienced major reforms in the social security 
and employment policy for the elderly, motivated by serious concerns about the sustainability of 
the current system and the deterioration of fiscal balances in future. However, in contrast to the 
significant number of discussions on the fiscal effects of such reforms, the impact of the changing 
generosity of social security programs on the labor supply of the elderly has been largely 
disregarded thus far. 
Quantifying the labor supply effect of social security programs is of importance to both 
academics and policymakers in the context of future reforms, which will take place under 
conditions of harsher demographic pressures and reduced feasibility in further raising the 
mandatory retirement age limit. Moreover, separating out the effect of social security programs 
from other factors is also critical to explore why Japanese people are motivated to retire later than 
people belonging to other developed countries. It has often been argued that less generous social 
security programs encourage Japanese workers to remain longer in the labor force.
1 However, 
most of the preceding studies in Japan are limited to the analysis of the effect of the changes in 
                                                      
1 There have also been a considerable number of policy debates on the effects of social security programs on the 
employment/unemployment of the youth, especially in European countries. After the mid-1970s, which witnessed a 
high rate of unemployment among the youth, many European countries introduced more incentives for the elderly to 
exit the labor force in order to create jobs for the young population,  e.g., the “Job Release Scheme in the U.K. 
However, this issue is largely irrelevant to and rarely discussed in the context of Japan.   3
the income-tested pension program (Zaishoku Pension). A more important issue that is yet to be 
examined concerns the effect of a series of major reforms of the main body of social security 
programs on the LFP of the elderly.
2  
This paper investigates the manner in which the changing generosity of social security 
programs has affected the withdrawal of the elderly from the labor force in Japan over the past 
forty years. To examine the relation between social security programs and the retirement 
decisions of the elderly, we construct some forward-looking measures that provide an incentive to 
retire, on the basis of publicly available year-by-age data. These measures are based on the notion 
of social security wealth (SSW), which is defined as the expected present value of net social 
security benefits received over a lifetime (see Gruber and Wise (1999)). Retirement decisions are 
determined not only by the income at the time of retirement but also by the flow of future social 
security benefits and their present value (see Stock and Wise (2000a, 2000b)). Moreover, a 
rational individual is likely to determine his/her retirement age by considering the potential gains 
from the postponement of his/her retirement (see Coile and Gruber (2000a, 2000b)). To address 
these issues, we construct three incentive measures for inducing retirement—social security 
wealth accrual (SSA), peak value (PV), and option value (OV)—derived from or related to SSW 
and, subsequently, examine the effect of these measures on the labor supply of the elderly. 
In addition to understanding the dynamic elements of the incentive measures for inducing 
retirement, two econometric issues need to be resolved. The first is the simultaneity bias in 
estimations. Relating the incentive measures to the actual probability of retirement is not free 
from a simultaneous estimation bias because observed decisions and social security benefits are 
jointly determined. We will solely focus on the variations in the benefits that arise from 
institutional changes in social security programs and that are exogenous to individual retirement 
decisions. The second is the limited data availability in Japan. We recognize that it is 
advantageous to utilize household-level data on households who are provided with a variety of 
                                                      
2 See, for example, Seike (1993), Ogawa (1998a, 1998b), Iwamoto (2000), Abe (2001), and Ohtake and Yamaga (2003).   4
incentive measures. Unfortunately, there is no micro-level dataset with longitudinal information 
that entails a long period and several social security reforms. 
This analysis focuses on the aggregate year-by-age-group data of LFP and the incentive 
measures for inducing retirement because only the data concerning five-year age groups was 
available from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) compiled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIAC). This empirical analysis is based on 120 observations of males and 
females belonging to the age groups of 55–59, 60–64, and 65–69 years over a period of forty 
years (1968 to 2007). We adopt the following empirical strategy to address the simultaneity bias 
in estimations. First, we establish a “typical person”—specifically, one who was born in 1935 
and whose earnings profile over his/her lifetime is identical to the average for his/her cohort—and 
assume that he/she is 55 years old. We compute his/her benefits and incentive measures under the 
social security programs available in each year. Second, we compute the weighted averages of the 
incentive measures for each age group for each year in order to understand the overall generosity 
of the social security programs for each age group. Then, we estimate the regression models to 
relate the LFP of each age group to the estimated incentive measures along with the covariates. 
Moreover, we conduct counter-historical simulations to assess the impact of the key reforms on 
the LFP of the elderly since the mid-1980s. 
This empirical analysis yielded three findings. First, the estimated age-average SSW peaked 
in the mid-1980s as the social security programs became more generous until the 1985 Reform 
and had been declining since then. Second, the regression results reveal that the retirement 
decisions of elderly workers are significantly sensitive to OV, which incorporates utilities from 
wage earnings as well as from social security benefits. Finally, the counter-historical simulations 
show that the 1985 Reform and subsequent reforms encouraged the elderly to remain longer in 
the labor force.   5
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a historical overview of major reforms in 
social security programs and employment policies concerning the elderly in Japan. Section 3 
explains how to construct incentive measures. Section 4 assesses the changes in the generosity of 
social security programs over the past reforms and examines the relation between incentive 
measures and labor supply of the elderly. Section 5 conducts counter-historical simulations to 
capture the impact of social security reforms on the LFP of the elderly. Finally, Section 6 
provides the concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Overview of social security reforms in Japan 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the major social security reforms for the elderly 
since the 1970s.
3 Table 1 summarizes the history of previous reforms in terms of the benefits of 
the Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI; Kosei Nenkin) and National Pension Insurance (NPI; 
Kokumin Nenkin), both of which form the core of Japanese social security programs.
4 EPI 
benefits comprise a flat-rate component, which is referred to as the Basic Pension benefit since 
the 1985 Reform, and a wage-proportional component. NPI has a flat-rate benefit only, and the 
amount is equal to that of the flat-rate component of EPI. 
We observe a remarkable difference in the direction of reforms before and after 1985 in terms 
of the overall generosity of the programs. Before the 1985 Reform, the government continued to 
raise the benefit levels by increasing the benefit multiplier for the wage-proportional benefit 
and/or the benefit unit for its flat-rate benefit. In addition, price indexation was introduced to 
accommodate the high inflation rate in 1973. These reforms sought to improve the standard of 
living of the elderly in accordance with a steady increase in the per capita GDP during the phase 
                                                      
3 Komamura (2005) presents a comprehensive survey of social security reforms in Japan. Takayama (2005, Ch.6) 
discusses the key issues in the 2004 Reform. 
4 EPI and NPI respectively cover 48.0 and 45.5 percent of population insured by the public pension programs in 2007. 
The Mutual Aid Insurance (Kyosai Nenkin) covers the remaining 6.5 percent, most of whom are employees in the 
public sector and private schools.   6
of rapid economic growth. 
However, a fall in the economic growth after the oil crisis in the early 1970s as well as the 
declining trend of fertility raised concerns about the financial sustainability of social security 
programs. In addition, structural changes in the industry and labor force led to a larger disparity in 
financial positions among the programs. These concerns motivated the 1985 Reform, which 
called for a reduction in the benefit multiplier and flat-rate benefit for the first time. At the same 
time, the Basic Pension benefit, which was commonly paid to all public pension members as a 
first-tier flat benefit, was introduced.  
While the dependent spouses of EPI beneficiaries became eligible to receive the Basic 
Pension benefit without any premium in this reform, the EPI programs became less generous in 
terms of benefits. Under the 1985 Reform scheme, a male EPI beneficiary who earned an average 
income of 254,000 yen per month in 1985, contributed 40 years in the labor market, and had a 
dependent wife was eligible to receive a total of around 176,000 yen per month; this was less than 
the amount provided under the pre-1985 Reform scheme—approximately 198,000 yen—by more 
than 10 percent. 
Subsequent reforms have consistently sought to improve the financial balance of the programs 
by reducing the benefit multiplier, scaling down benefit indexations, raising the eligibility age as 
well as the premium rates. Most recently, the 2004 Reform introduced the automatic adjustment 
of benefit levels to demographic and macro-economic factors. Meanwhile, the eligibility age for 
receiving EPI benefits continues to be raised. For male pensioners, the eligibility age for 
receiving both flat-rate and wage-proportional benefits was raised from 55 to 60 years in 1973. 
Since 2001, the eligibility age for the flat-rate component has been scheduled to increase by one 
year for every three years to reach 65 years in 2013; further, that for the wage-proportional 
component has been scheduled to rise from 2013 by one year for every three years to reach 65 
years in 2025. For females, the eligibility age was 55 years until 1985 and was gradually raised to 
60 years in 2000. The eligibility age for females is set to be raised, keeping a five-year lag   7
relative to that for men. The eligibility age for the flat-rate benefit will be raised beginning 2006 
and that for the wage-proportional benefit will be raised beginning 2018. 
Another reform in the EPI scheme is Zaishoku Pension. This income-tested pension program 
applies to those who remain in the labor force past their eligibility age. Starting with a 20 percent 
reduction in the benefit for working beneficiaries in the 1950s, the effective tax rate on additional 
work has been revised several times. Under the current scheme, 0.5 yen is reduced for each 
additional 1 yen of the sum of the original benefit and monthly wage in excess of 480,000 yen. 
Indeed, many empirical studies have estimated the impact of the Zaishoku Pension program based 
on micro-level data.
5 Most of them found that the reforms in the program encouraged the elderly 
to remain longer in the labor force, although the magnitude of the estimated impact varies 
substantially. As discussed in the next section, we explicitly incorporate Zaishoku Pension in 
constructing incentive measures, as well as the Additional Pension (Kakyu Nenkin) benefit 
provided to EPI beneficiaries for their dependent spouses. 
In addition to the social security programs, the government introduced the wage subsidy 
program for the elderly in 1995. This program started by subsidizing 25 percent of the wages of 
individuals aged 60–64 years who continued to work in the same firm at a wage rate less than 64 
percent of what they earned at the pre-retirement level.
6  We interpret this wage subsidy as 
negative premium and incorporate it to calculate the SSW and incentive measures on a net basis. 
Since 1998, the Zaishoku Pension benefit has been reduced for those who receive the wage 
subsidy, and the subsidy rate was reduced to 15 percent in 2003.  
Finally, the employment policies for the elderly have aimed at providing additional job 
opportunities to the elderly, whose eligibility age was raised. In 1973, the government began to 
encourage firms to raise the mandatory retirement age to 60 years, which was set as the 
obligatory target in 1986. In 2000 and 2004, the government proposed that firms to either raise 
                                                      
5 See the references listed in footnote 2. 
6 The wage subsidy is reduced for higher-wage earners. Our calculations also incorporate this formula.   8
the mandatory retirement age to 65 years or to completely abolish it. In response to these policy 
changes, the average mandatory retirement age has been rising substantially, and we take this into 
account in our empirical analysis by including the share of firms with a mandatory retirement age 
of 60 years or above as a covariate.
7 
 
3. Incentive measures for inducing retirement  
 
3.1 Defining incentive measures 
This section explains how to construct incentive measures for inducing retirement, which aim to 
highlight the key aspects of the incentive measures including the eligibility age, the benefits given 
eligibility, and actuarial adjustment when retirement is delayed. The basic idea underlying these 
measures is that an individual is forward-looking and that his/her labor supply decision is affected 
not only by the current economic resources but also by the discounted value of future benefits. As 
mentioned earlier, we consider three types of incentive measures—SSA, OV, and PV—all of 
which are based on or related to SSW. 
To begin with, we explain how to compute SSW for an individual in a specific year and age 
cohort. Suppose that an individual who is now aged t considers when he/she should retire. If 
he/she retires at age r (≥ t), his/her (gross) SSW, which is denoted by SSWt (r), is calculated as 




t s t ∑
=
− ≡                                                (1)  
where Bs (r) is the benefit that he/she is expected to receive at age s (≥ r), d is the cumulative 
discount rate, ps|t is the probability that he/she is being alive at age s conditional on being alive at 
age t, and D is the maximum age. Bs (r) usually tends to rise as r increases, reflecting a longer 
period of premium contributions, and is equal to zero if s is below the eligibility age. SSWt (r) is 
                                                      
7  We do not take into account income tax in constructing incentive measures because most of the income earned by the 
elderly has been exempted by the income tax system.    9
likely to be an increasing function of r provided r is not far from t. However, it may decline once 
r increases to a certain level because larger contributions exceed the benefits received over a 
lifetime. Furthermore, we compute SSW on a net basis because an individual is likely to take 
account of the additional premium payment if he/she continues working as an employee. Finally, 
we set t = 55, assuming that an individual starts considering retirement at age55. This assumption 
is reasonable given that the number of people who retire before 55 is extremely limited. 
Then, we derive the three incentive measures. We begin with SSA, which is defined as the 
change in the promised social security benefits in the future derived from working for one 
additional year (see Gruber and Wise (1999)). The SSA at age r when the retirement age is t is 
given by 
() ( ) ( ). 1 r SSW r SSW r SSA t t t − + ≡                                          (2) 
If an individual continues to work for one additional year, he/she has to give up the benefits 
that he/she is eligible to receive in that year; however, he/she can expect a future increase in the 
benefits. Therefore, SSA can be either positive or negative on a net basis. If it is positive 
(negative), an individual would want to continue working (retire). Further, it should be noted that 
SSA is most likely to be positive before the eligibility age because although an individual does 
not receive any benefits until that age, he/she can expect an increase in future benefits.  
However, a rational individual may be more forward-looking and take account of his/her 
financial position beyond one-year accruals. Stock and Wise (1990) proposed the option value 
model by comparing the utility today with that at the optimal retirement age in future. The option 
value model is based on an individual’s indirect utility function over work and leisure, expressed 
as follows: 
() () () [] , 1 , 1 0 ,
1

















t s t              (3) 
where y is the wage income while working, g is the parameter of risk aversion, and k is the 
parameter to account for the disutility of labor. The optimal age of retirement is the age at which   10
the indirect utility is maximized; the age at which the utility gain derived from the wage increase 
resulting from additional work begins to be outweighed by the utility loss from the decrease in the 
retirement income.
8  
Next, OV is defined as the difference between the indirect utility from retirement at the 
optimal age r* and the indirect utility from retiring today. It can be expressed as   
() ( ) () .
* r V r V r OV t t t − ≡                                                (4) 
In our estimations and simulations, we follow Stock and Wise (1990), who assumed values of 1.5 
and 0.75 for k and g, respectively.
9  
   One possible drawback of the option value model is that much of the variation in this measure 
arises from the differences in the wage income, which may not be a legitimate source of 
identification for the retirement effects. To address this shortcoming, Coile and Gruber (2000a, 
2000b) proposed another measure. PV is defined as the difference between SSW at the maximum 
expected value and SSW at the value at each age, such that 
                () ( ) ( ),
* * r SSW r SSW r PV t t t − ≡                                   (5) 
where SSW is maximized at age r
**. If the individual retires at an age beyond r
**, then it is 
reasonable to define PV as the difference between retirement this year and the next, thereby 
making it identical to SSA. 
 
3.2 Computing incentive measures 
To calculate SSW and incentive measures, we follow two steps. First, we compute these measures 
for an individual aged 55 years for each year, assuming him/her to be a “typical person” as 
defined earlier. Second, we aggregate them by considering the weighted averages of the three age 
groups (55–59, 60–64, and 65–69 years) for each year. One reasonable way to understand the 
                                                      
8  The second term on the right-hand side in (3) is equivalent to SSWt (r), if g = 1 and k = 1. 
9  Coile and Gruber (2004) reported that the estimation results on the relation between OV and the elderly labor force 
are not sensitive to the choice of these two parameters in the U.S.   11
changes in the generosity of social security programs is to place the typical person in each year 
and provide him/her with the social security programs available at that time. Based on his/her 
earnings profile, we calculate his/her SSW and the related incentive measures under the existing 
social security program for each year. Then, we evaluate the benefits—more specifically, the 
benefit per month of contributions for both flat-rate and wage-proportional benefits as well as 
other nominal values of fixed benefits—at 2005 prices, using the consumer price index. 
We choose male and female employees who were born in 1935 as typical persons and obtain 
their average wage incomes. They were 55 years old in 1990, which is approximately the middle 
year in our estimation period between 1968 and 2007. Although official statistics do not provide 
any longitudinal data on the history of workers’ wage earnings, the Annual Report of the Social 
Insurance Agency (SIA) presents the average of the career average monthly income (CAMI) of 
the initial EMI beneficiaries for each year. The 1995 SIA Report showed that the average CAMI 
for the initial beneficiaries was 337,549 yen and that the average months of contribution 
amounted to 409. The Report also showed that 56 percent of those who initially claimed EPI 
benefits in 1995 were aged 60 (their birth year being 1935) and were eligible for EPI benefits. For 
a typical female, the 1993 SIA Report showed the average CAMI to be 158,737 yen and the 
average months of contribution to be 276 months, given that the eligibility age of females was 58 
at that time.  
Then, each year, we make the typical person aged 55 consider the timing of his/her retirement 
under the existing social security programs. We calculate his/her CAMI at age 55 on the basis of 
the wage incomes and the period of premium contribution at age 60 or 58, as obtained from the 
SIA Report. We also assume that the typical person expects future wage profiles beyond the age 
of 55, as per the actual observations made from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Wage 
Census) compiled by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW).  
Then, we apply the EPI benefit formula to calculate the benefit that an individual who retires 
between 55 and 69 years of age is supposed to receive. The EPI benefits to be received at age s on   12
condition of retiring at age r are expressed as   
() ( ) m r CAMI k m k r Bs , 1 0 + = for  e r r ≥ ;                              (6) 
0 =  for  , e r r <  
where the first and second terms of the RHS correspond to the flat-rate and wage-proportional 
components, respectively; k0 and k1 are their respective multipliers; m is the months of premium 
contribution; and re is the eligibility age.
10 If an individual works for ∆r additional years after age 
r and earns wage income yr per year, his/her benefit is recalculated as 
() ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) r m r y m r mCAMI k r m k r r B r s Δ + Δ + + Δ + = Δ + / , 1 0 ,           (7) 
where social security reforms are expressed in the shape of the changes in the statutory 
parameters k0 , k1, and r.
11  
In addition, we take into account the following three points. First, we assume that 90.8 percent 
of male workers have non-working dependent wives two years their junior.
12 More specifically, 
we assume that they receive an additional 90.8 percent of the flat-rate Additional Pension benefit 
for their wives until their wives turn 65 and become eligible to receive their Basic Pension 
benefits.
13 Second, if one chooses to both continue working and receive EPI benefits, the benefits 
are reduced according to the Zaishoku Pension program. In addition, provided that an individual 
continues working and paying premiums, his/her future benefits will increase corresponding to 
additional premium contributions. Third, the EPI premiums paid during work are subtracted when 
SSW is calculated on a net basis.
14 If one retires before the age of 60, he/she has to pay NPI 
                                                      
10 To avoid drastic changes in the generosity of benefits, the government usually applies a gradual shift of parameter 
values corresponding to the year of birth. We ignore price indexation because all variables are based on the prices in 
2005 in our calculations. 
11 The main parameter values for individuals aged 55 in each year have not been reported owing to space constraints; 
however, they are available from the authors upon request. 
12 90.8 percent was the rate of married males aged 55 in 1990, which is estimated from the Census in 1990. Under the 
current social security system, a wife is regarded as “a non-working dependent wife” unless she earns more than 1.3 
million yen annually or her weekly working hours exceed 30 hours a week (see Abe and Oishi (2007)). 
13 We do not add the wife’s Basic Pension benefit to SSW, because the couple receives it once the wife turns 65, 
regardless of the husband’s decision on retirement. There is another additional pension benefit for the wife aged 65 
and above, but we ignore it for simplicity.  
14 Until 2001, the EPI members did not have to pay premiums at age 65 and above. Since 2002, they have been 
required to pay them, as the Zaishoku Pension program has been reintroduced.   13
premiums until that time. To compute OV, we subtract premiums from wage earnings. We 
disregard income and other taxes for simplicity. Although we compute the benefits and SSW for a 
female EPI member in almost the same manner, we assume that she considers only her own 
benefit.  
When computing SSW and the incentive measures, we have to set up the values of the 
cumulative discount rate d
s-55, and the probability of being alive conditional on being alive at age 
55, ps|55, in (1). We assume that d 
s-55 = (1/1.0319)
 s-55, where the yield on the ten-year government 
bond was 3.19 percent in 1990, when the typical person was aged 55
15. We estimate the 
probability of being alive based on the 17
th Life Table compiled by the MHLW in 1990.  
Next, we proceed to the second step. After constructing SSW and the incentive measures for 
each year and age, we obtain the aggregates for each age group and each year. Let SSWr (y) 
denote SSW for those who retire at age r in year y. For example, consider the average SSW of all 
persons aged between 55 and 59 who withdrew from the labor force in 1990; let 
() 1990 59 55− SSW  denote this average. We need the SSW of those individuals aged 55 in 1990 
who would have retired in this year, that is, SSW55 (1990). Since individuals aged 56 in 1990 
would have retired either at 55 in 1989 or at 56 in 1990, we need both SSW55 (1989) and SSW56 
(1990).  
Next, we weight these wealth numbers by q55 (1989) and q56 (1990), where qr (y) measures the 
odds of exposure to the retirement incentives for each age given the year. In the same manner, 
individuals aged 57 in 1990 would have retired at age 55 in 1988, 56 in 1989, or 57 in 1990. Thus, 
we need SSW55 (1988), SSW56 (1989), and SSW57 (1990). Further, we weight these numbers by q55 
(1987) and q55 (1988), q56 (1989), and q57 (1990), respectively. In order to compute the weighted 
average of SSW for all persons aged between 55 and 59 who retired in 1980, we calculate the 
weighted average of the exposure to the incentive measure provided to retired persons at a given 
                                                      
15 We realized that the assumptions of different interest rates do not change the main estimation results.   14
age in 1990, and then, we weight the expected exposure at the given age by the proportion of 




































































.                    (8) 
Here, we assume that weight qr (y) reflects the proportion of persons who retired at age r in 
year y and were thus provided SSWr (y); hence, we consider the proportion of people in the labor 
force at age r in year t-1, that is, qr-t (y-t) = LFPr-t (y-t-1), where LFP is the LFP rate. Similarly, we 
compute the weighted average of all ages by attaching weights with the proportion of retired 
persons aged r in year y, denoted by ( ) y r γ . In the same manner, we can calculate the weighted 
average of each incentive measure for each age group by gender for each year. We follow the 
same process to aggregate the SSW and incentive measures for persons aged between 60–64 and 
65–69. 
Although our methodology cannot completely disregard the following two endogeneity biases, 
we believe that they hold little importance. First, the wage profile of the typical person was 
affected by the social security programs that he/she were actually provided with. This bias is 
unlikely to substantially affect the estimation results, provided we focus on the change in the 
impact of the incentive measures over time. In other words, we set a cohort in order to separate 
the effect of social security reforms from the changes in the earnings profiles. 
Second, the observed LFP, on which our calculations of the weighted averages of incentive 
measures for each year are based, is also affected by the existing programs. Although this bias 
cannot be disregarded, it is obviously smaller than what it would have been if we used the actual 
wage profile of each cohort, which is more jointly determined with the actual LFP than the fixed 
wage profile. 
   15
3.3 Labor market outcomes 
For labor market outcomes, we use the data on the labor force and employment, which are 
available from the LFS as compiled by the MIAC. The LFS provides annual data on labor force 
and employment for males and females separately from the year 1968. We will focus on 
employees because the self-employed elderly are covered by the flat-rate NPI and they seem to 
make different decisions on retirement as compared to those employees. However, the LFS does 
not classify employees into private- and public-sector employees, the latter of whom are covered 
by the Mutual Aid Insurance (MAI, Kyosai Kumiai). This empirical analysis is based on all 
employees because MAI programs and their reforms are similar to those of EPI and because MAI 
members account for less than 8 percent of the overall labor force.  
In addition, we redefine the LFP rate in this analysis as the ratio of employees to the 
population, excluding the self-employed and unpaid family workers, in order to concentrate on 
the retirement decisions by the employees. We refer to this redefined LFP rate as the 
“employment-based” LFP rate hereafter. This definition disregards the course of retirement from 
being employees in the main workplace to becoming self-employed, unpaid family workers, or 
unemployed.
16 However, this bias is far less serious than that stemming from the conventionally 
defined LFP rate, which is affected by a structural shift from being self-employed and family 
workers to becoming employees.
17 Figure 1 compares the long-term trends of the conventionally 
defined, employee-based LFP rates for those aged between 55 and 69 over the past four decades. 
While these two LFP rates move in a parallel manner, the gap has become smaller in recent years.  
We also note that the LFS provides the data only for five-year age groups rather than for each 
age. Hence, we have to limit our analysis to three age groups (55–59, 60–64, and 65–69 years) 
and use the same LFP rates and corresponding qr (y) for those who are included in each age group. 
                                                      
16   According to the Survey on the Labor Participation of Older Workers 2004 compiled by the MHLW, the gaps in 
the proportion of self-employed persons (including unpaid family workers) in the population aged between 55–59 
and 60–64 years were 1.3 and 0.5 percentage points for males and females, respectively, implying that the pathway 
to becoming self-employed is narrow. 
17  In fact, the share of employees in the total labor force aged 55–69 increased—for males and females, respectively—
to 90.7 percent and 90.5 percent in 2007 from 68.7 percent and 54.2 percent in 1968.   16
However, we can obtain the annual data of population by each age group  from the Population 
Estimates provided by the MIAC. Therefore, we estimate the numbers of employees (individuals 
who are in the labor force, by our definition) and retired persons by multiplying the population by 
the employee-based LFP rates calculated from the LFS. Then, we estimate γr (y), the proportion of 
retired persons of each age group based on these figures. 
 
4. Empirical results  
 
4.1 Social security reforms and changing generosity 
This section assesses the change in the generosity levels of social security programs and examines 
the relation between the incentive measures and retirement. Table 2 shows the SSW and incentive 
measures for each retirement age in 1970, 1985, and 2005, all of which are based on the same 
wage profile of the typical person (born in 1935), evaluated based on 2005 prices. We choose the 
year 1985 because social security reforms changed their direction in that year, as described in 
Table 1. 
The following five points are noteworthy. First, we confirm that SSW was the highest in 1985 
for both males and females. This is consistent with the history of social security reforms; the 
generosity of the programs increased until the 1985 Reform and has been steadily decreasing 
since then. This pattern is more obvious in females than in males who enjoyed an increase in the 
Additional Pension benefit, which partly offset a reduction in the generosity of the main body of 
EPI benefits. 
Second, over the 35 years, the age for the maximum SSW was raised by just one year from 59 
to 60 for males, whereas after 1985, it was raised by six years from 55 to 61 for females. This 
mainly reflects a difference in the shift of the eligibility age for the wage-proportional component 
between males and females; eligibility age for females was 55 until 1985 and was subsequently 
gradually raised to 60, while it had already been raised from 59 to 60 in the early 1970s for males.    17
Third, SSA and PV show similar patterns for males and females across age groups. For males, 
both SSA and PV remain positive until SSW reaches its maximum at age 59 or 60 and then turn 
negative in each year. This implies that it was reasonable for males to retire at 59 or 60, judging 
by these incentive measures. For females, in 1970 and 1985, when the eligibility age for the 
wage-proportional component was fixed at 55, SSA and PV began with a negative figure at that 
age. They turned positive at age 65, reflecting that they could receive the complete benefit if they 
work after age 65, in 1970 and 1985. In 2005, however, the patterns of SSA and PV across ages 
turned to be the same as those for males; they remained positive until age 60 and then turned 
negative because the benefit formula and eligibility was almost the same between males and 
females. 
Next, the absolute values of SSA and PV for males were higher in 1985 than in 1970 and 
2005, reflecting that the benefit was the highest in 1985. In 1985, individuals were encouraged to 
continue work until the age of 60 and to retire after 60, as compared to the situation in 1970 and 
2005. Hence, it is likely that the weighted average of SSA or PV tended to rise until 1985 and 
then fall, because the share of cohorts who faced higher positive values increased first and, 
subsequently, that of those who faced higher negative values increased. 
    Finally, OV monotonically declined with age for both males and females with the increase in 
their age each year. This is because the sum of utility from wage income and that from benefits—
V(r) in (3)—increased monotonically until age 69 because in most cases, those aged 65 and older 
could obtain a full benefit even if they continued working. Hence, OV—which is defined as 
V(69)–V(r) at age r—declined as the age increased to 69. An interesting revelation is that OV was 
the lowest in 1985 for both males and females. At first glance, this appears to be inconsistent with 
a long-term change in the benefits, which rose until 1985 and decreased afterwards. However, it 
is important to note that greater generosity implied greater benefits to be given up when 
postponing retirement. This effect was likely to be more than an offset of an increase in future 
benefit gains, and led to a reduction in OV.    18
Figure 2 depicts the long-term trends of SSW and incentive measures for those aged 55–69 
years to capture the change in the overall generosity of the social security programs. An inverse-
U-shaped SSW curve confirms that the generosity peaked in the mid-1980s for both males and 
females and ascertains the change in the direction of social security reforms, which is 
summarized in Table 2. The change was more remarkable for females than males. 
The OV curves also demonstrate almost the same U-shaped trends for both males and females. 
A downward sloping part of the OV curve corresponds to the enhanced benefits, pointing to the 
rising incentives to retire. However, OV has been on an upward trend due to reduced benefits for 
females since the mid-1980s, and somewhat later for males. An earlier turnaround of the curve for 
females is due to an increase in their eligibility age since the mid-1980s. 
In contrast, the SSA and PV curves present rather different shapes for males and females. For 
females, both the SSA and PV curves are U-shaped, which is consistent with the SSW and OV 
curves. Before the mid-1980s, a rise in benefits with a fixed eligibility age tended to reduce SSW 
and these trends turned around in the mid-1980s, reflecting a gradual shift to less generous 
programs. For males, the PV curve has an inverse-U shape and shows a cyclical movement. As 
already suggested by Table 2, the programs’ increasing generosity tended to raise both the 
positive (before the age of 60) and negative (after the age of 60) values of SSA and PV, thus 
rendering the direction of their averages across age groups unclear. For example, the PV curve 
shows an upward trend until the mid-1980s due to a rise in the maximum SSW at age 60, which 
dominated a larger reduction in SSA after that age. It is difficult, however, to conclude from this 
curve that an increase in the generosity toward the 1985 Reform encouraged the elderly to 
postpone their retirement. This is also the cause for the downward slope of the PV curve after the 
mid-1980s. Indeed, our regression results on the relation between the LFP and SSA or PV for 
males are difficult to interpret. 
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4.2 Regression results 
Next, we examine how the LFP of the elderly has been affected by social security programs in 
terms of the incentive measures.
18 The dependent variable is the employee-based LFP rate, which 
is defined as the share of employees in the population excluding the self-employed and family 
workers. This empirical analysis is based on 120 observations of males and females in the age 
groups of 55–59, 60–64, and 65–69 years over a period of forty years (1968 to 2007). The LFP 
rate, SSW, and three incentive measures are all aggregated for each age group. We estimate three 
regression models for SSA, PV, and OV (and for SSW, for reference), for males and females: 
    Model 1:  ya
j
j
y j ya ya COV IM LFP ε γ β α + + + = ∑                              (9) 
    Model 2:  ya
j
j
y j ya ya ya ya COV D D IM LFP ε γ δ δ β α + + + + + = ∑ 6569 6064 2 1      (10) 
    Model 3:  ya
j
j
y j ya ya COV IM LFP ε γ β α + Δ + Δ + = Δ ∑               (11) 
Here, LFP is the employee-based LFP rate; IM is an incentive measure (SSA, PV, or OV); COVs 
are the covariates; D6064 and D6569 are the dummies for the age groups 60–64 and 65–69, 
respectively; and ε  is an error term. We include three covariates: per capita real GDP, the share 
of manufacturing in nominal GDP, and the share of firms with the mandatory retirement age of 60 
or above. The first two covariates are obtained from the national accounts published by the 
Cabinet Office, and the last from the Employment Management Survey compiled by the 
MHLW.
19 The per capita real GDP is a proxy for the real wage rate and is used to adjust for 
cyclical movements in the LFP. The share of manufacturing and that of firms with the mandatory 
retirement age of 60 or above are used to capture the structural changes in demand for the elderly 
labor force.   
Model 1 is the simplest version among the three models. Although the coefficient on the 
                                                      
18 Oshio and Oishi (2004) is an early example of a study that applies the incentive measures to the Japanese micro data. 
19 The Employment Management Survey concluded in 2004. We assume that the share of firms with the mandatory 
retirement age of 60 or above has remained at 99.3 since 2004.   20
incentive measure is expected to be positive, it may fail to distinguish the impact of the incentive 
measure from age-specific factors. Hence, Model 2 controls for these factors by including 
dummies of two age groups. Given that the retirement rate tends to rise as age increases, the 
coefficients on those dummy variables are expected to be negative. Model 3 is a difference model, 
which intends to control for trend as well as age-specific factors. We also attempt to use SSW as 
IM instead of incentive measures because we cannot rule out the possibility that the elderly take 
into account SSW itself rather than the change in it. In contrast to other incentive measures, it 
should be noted that the coefficient on SSW is expected to be negative. 
Table 3 summarizes the regression results of each model for both males and females. We 
focus on the coefficients on the incentive measures and SSW to save space. In Model 1, we 
observe that SSA, PV, and OV have significant and positive coefficients for both males and 
females, as predicted. However, we should consider the possibility that this model overestimates 
the impact of the incentive measures, which are strongly age-specific, as suggested by Table 2.  
Model 2 includes age group dummies and produces different results between males and 
females, while the fitness is much improved for both males and females. For males, although the 
coefficient on OV remains significant and positive, that on SSA or PV turns negative. The 
coefficient on SSA or PV is not consistent with the prediction; however, it may suggest that the 
weighted averages of SSA and PV over age groups are not a good indicator of the overall 
incentives to postpone retirement, as already inferred from Figure 2. For females, SSA, PV, and 
OV remain significant and positive in Model 2. The sizes of the coefficients on the incentive 
measures are much smaller than those in Model 1, in line with the expectation.  
Model 3, which uses five-year differences of all variables, reveals the same pattern in the size 
and significance of the incentive measures as Model 2 does. All measures are significant and 
positive for females, whereas only OV is significant and positive for males.  
Finally, we observe that SSW is significant and negative for both males and females in 
Models 2 and 3 and that the goodness-of-fit is not worse than in the cases of the incentive   21
measures, suggesting that the elderly may be concerned about the current SSW to almost the 
same extent as they are its future changes. 
 
5. Policy simulations  
 
This section performs counter-historical simulations to estimate the extent to which a series of 
social security reforms have affected the labor supply of the elderly since 1985. First, we explore 
the effects on SSW and incentive measures had the government not implemented major social 
security reforms. For example, to understand the impact of the 1985 Reform and subsequent 
reforms, we construct all the parameters in the social security programs including the benefit 
multiplier, premium rates, and eligibility ages fixed in 1984, and construct the paths that SSW and 
the incentive measures would have taken since 1985 without any reform. In the same manner, we 
can construct the paths without reforms since the 1989 Reform, which followed the 1985 Reform. 
It is also reasonable to roughly interpret the difference between these simulated paths as the 
impact of the 1985 Reform. We can repeat the same experiments to capture the impact of each 
reform. 
Figure 3 illustrates the results of these counter-historical simulations in terms of SSW for 
males and females. For example, the curve labeled “Without reform since 1985” depicts the path 
that SSW would have taken if the social security reform stopped just before the 1985 Reform. In 
this case, SSW for males would have continued to increase and would have leveled off in the 
early 2000s, as all the cohorts would have adopted the scheme that was applied just before the 
1985 Reform. A series of reforms since 1985 led the SSW curve to peak in the mid-1980s and 
then slope downward. The decline continued with all the subsequent reforms; however, the 
impact of the 1985 Reform has been larger than that of any other reforms.  
The impact of social security reforms is also clearly observed in the case of females. The 
impact differs from that for males in that SSW continued to decline before rising again and   22
stabilizing in the early 2000s when there were no reforms since 1985. This is because the flat-rate 
component, which accounted for more in total benefits for females than for males, was reduced in 
real terms since the late 1970s, this holding the former’s total benefit down. Nevertheless, the 
figure confirms that the generosity of social security reforms has been steadily reducing since 
1985. 
Based on these observations, we confirm a substantial reduction in the overall generosity of 
social security programs over the past two decades. Indeed, in the absence of the 1985 Reform 
and subsequent reforms, the average SSW for age 55–69 (evaluated at 2005 prices) would have 
been 1.84 million for males and 1.03 million for females in 2007, which are 31.4 percent and 45.1 
percent lower than the actual levels (2.68 million and 1.88 million), respectively. In the same 
manner, we can construct the path which each incentive measure would have taken in the absence 
of social security reforms. Figure 4 shows how the OV has been affected by the reforms. Had 
there been no reform since 1985, OV would have kept declining until the late 1990s for males and 
remained a while longer at a low level for females.  
Further, we estimate the impact of social security reforms on the LFP of the elderly. One 
reasonable way is to compute the LFP rates by substituting the values of the incentive measures 
obtained from each simulation as well as the values of covariates into (10) or (11) and using the 
estimated coefficients reported in Table 3. We use the OV results, which are most reasonable and 
consistent between males and females. Table 4 presents the simulation results, which are based on 
the estimation results from Model 2 (levels) and Model 3 (differences). The top and bottom 
panels are based on the OV and SSW results, respectively. 
In the top panel, we observe that in Model 2, the male labor force aged 55–69 years would 
have been an average of 6.484 million per year during 1985 and 2007, in the absence of the 1985 
Reform and subsequent reforms. Given that the baseline result is 6.697 million (which is close to 
the actual 6.717 million), these reforms since 1985 as a whole increased the male labor force by 
214 thousand per year—equivalent to 3.3 percent of the LFP that would have been realized had   23
there been no reform since 1985. The size of the impact is smaller in the case of Model 3, which 
shows an additional 87 thousand employees or 1.3 percent of the LFP in the case of no reform. 
Table 4 also reports the results for females. The total impact for females is estimated to have been 
an average of 89 thousand (2.3 percent) in Model 2 and 25 thousand (0.6 percent) in Model 3 per 
year during 1985 and 2007; both figures are somewhat smaller than that for males.  
The bottom panel shows that the SSW and LFP of the elderly are reasonably related to each 
other as in the cases of the incentive measures. This result is reasonable, given that SSW and OV 
moved rather symmetrically over the past 40 years, as shown in Figure 2. In fact, Table 4 states 
that the impact is somewhat greater than in the OV version for both Models 2 and 3 for both 
males and females, underscoring that the impact of a series of social security reforms since 1985 
on the LFP of the elderly is not negligible. 
 
6.  Conclusion  
 
We examined how social security programs affect the LFP of the elderly in Japan. Using 
publicly available data, we construct forward-looking incentive measures based on the concepts 
of SSW and related incentive measures. This empirical analysis covers a period of forty years 
(1968–2007) that have marked significant changes in social security programs. Further, we 
compare the impact of major social security programs in the past on the labor supply of the 
elderly in a consistent manner. We acknowledge that our methodology can avoid, albeit not 
completely, the endogeneity bias regarding social security benefits and labor supply outcomes. 
Our main findings are summarized as follows. First, our calculations concerning SSW and 
the incentive measures reveal a substantial change in the social security policy in the mid-1980s. 
Although the generosity of social security programs was increasing, the 1985 Reform reversed 
the trend and the subsequent reforms featured a reduction in the generosity.  
Second, our regression analysis confirms that the LFP of the elderly is significantly affected   24
by forward-looking incentive measures for inducing retirement. In particular, the option value 
model of Stock and Wise (1990) appropriately explains the relation between social security and 
LFP for both the male and female elderly population.  
Third, our counter-historical simulations show that social security reforms encourage the 
elderly to continue working and postpone retirement via reduced generosity and increase in the 
eligibility age. The option value model estimates that the 1985 Reform and subsequent reforms 
increased the elderly labor force by 1.3–3.3 percent for males and 0.6–2.3 percent for females 
during the past two decades, as compared to the levels that would have been realized in the 
absence of a reform since 1985. The magnitude of the impact is sizable, given that Japan has 
already entered the phase of a declining population growth rate. 
This analysis can be extended in a variety of respects, provided the micro data with 
longitudinal information and family background are available. First, we can explicitly examine 
the impact of social security programs on multiple pathways to retirement (see Clark and Ogawa 
(1992)), which has been disregarded in many Japanese studies including our analysis. Second, we 
can analyze the impact of social security reforms by taking into account the simultaneous 
relations among LFP, benefit receipts, and living arrangements (see Raymo et al. (2004)). Third, 
we can compare social security programs with health status, financial support from children, and 
other factors in terms of the effect on the retirement decisions of the elderly. Finally, we can also 
discuss the impact of the changes in the generosity of social security programs on the overall 
well-being of the elderly, which covers health, poverty, and other socioeconomic aspects as well 
as income itself. 
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Table 1. Overview of key social security reforms in terms of benefits
Social security reform Wage-proportional benefit
Nominal 2005 prices Nominal 2005 prices
1954 5 24,000
a [ 127,292] - -
1959 6 24,000
a [ 127,620] 900/1,200
b [4,786/6,381]
1965 10 3,000 [   11,835] 2,400 [     9,468]
1969 10 4,800 [   15,602] 3,840 [   12,482]
1973 10 12,000 [   29,630] 9,600 [   23,704]
1976 10 19,800 [   32,459] 15,600 [   25,574]
1980 10 24,600 [   31,990] 20,160 [   26,203]
1985 7.5 15,000 [   17,026] 15,000 [   17,026]
1989 7.5 16,650 [   18,237] 16,650 [   18,237]
1994 7.5 19,500 [   19,345] 19,500 [   19,345]
2000 7.125 20,105 [   19,672] 20,105 [   19,672]
2004 7.125 20,105 [   20,045] 20,105 [   20,045]
(Note) a. Constant regardless of years of contributions.  b. 900 yen for less than 20 years and 1,200 yen for 20 years and above.
Male EPI pensioners receive the Additional Pension benefit for their dependent spouses. 
 per year of contribution  per year of contribution
Benefit multiplier (/1000)
Employees Pension Insurance National Pension Insurance
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Figure 1. Labor force participation rates  29
Table 2. SSW and incentive measures in 1970, 1985, and 2005
Males
SSW SSA PV OV SSW SSA PV OV SSW SSA PV OV
55 13,544 430 2,197 4,428 22,163 711 3,630 3,596 16,947 323 1,712 4,007
56 13,974 511 1,766 3,795 22,874 718 2,919 2,930 17,271 333 1,389 3,399
57 14,485 625 1,255 3,172 23,592 726 2,200 2,286 17,604 343 1,056 2,813
58 15,110 630 630 2,553 24,318 733 1,474 1,664 17,947 352 713 2,246
59 15,740 -539 -539 1,956 25,052 741 741 1,062 18,299 361 361 1,699
60 15,202 -685 -685 1,380 25,793 -1,440 -1,440 480 18,660 -505 -505 1,172
61 14,516 -709 -709 1,190 24,353 -1,451 -1,451 415 18,155 -501 -501 974
62 13,807 -729 -729 1,019 22,902 -1,458 -1,458 364 17,654 -347 -347 789
63 13,078 -746 -746 863 21,444 -1,460 -1,460 325 17,306 -825 -825 699
64 12,332 -758 -758 724 19,984 -1,458 -1,458 299 16,481 -830 -830 621
65 11,573 -534 -534 598 18,526 -1,007 -1,007 283 15,652 -686 -686 552
66 11,039 -508 -508 438 17,519 -959 -959 211 14,966 -777 -777 391
67 10,531 -483 -483 285 16,560 -911 -911 143 14,189 -801 -801 257
68 10,048 -458 -458 140 15,650 -863 -863 79 13,388 -577 -577 139
69 9,590 -458 -458 0 14,786 -863 -863 0 12,811 -577 -577 0
Females
SSW SSA PV OV SSW SSA PV OV SSW SSA PV OV
55 11,709 -247 -247 3,463 21,890 -246 -246 2,923 9,355 456 2,302 3,460
56 11,462 -272 -272 3,045 21,644 -315 -315 2,446 9,811 458 1,846 3,024
57 11,190 -178 -178 2,640 21,329 -379 -379 1,983 10,270 460 1,388 2,600
58 11,012 -106 -106 2,227 20,950 -439 -439 1,532 10,730 463 927 2,189
59 10,907 -150 -150 1,806 20,511 -494 -494 1,093 11,193 465 465 1,790
60 10,756 -198 -198 1,398 20,017 -614 -614 667 11,657 -23 -23 1,402
61 10,558 -237 -237 1,180 19,403 -659 -659 534 11,635 -65 -65 1,223
62 10,321 -272 -272 979 18,744 -699 -699 418 11,570 -104 -104 1,059
63 10,049 -305 -305 795 18,045 -735 -735 318 11,466 -141 -141 909
64 9,744 -335 -335 627 17,310 -768 -768 232 11,325 -175 -175 772
65 9,409 188 707 473 16,542 246 928 160 11,150 -308 -308 648
66 9,597 180 520 348 16,788 237 682 117 10,842 -331 -331 466
67 9,777 173 339 227 17,025 227 445 77 10,511 -352 -352 298
68 9,951 166 166 111 17,252 218 218 38 10,159 -371 -371 143
69 10,117 166 166 0 17,470 218 218 0 9,788 -371 -371 0
(Notes) 1) This table summarizes SSW and incentive measures (evaluated at 2005 prices) which the "typical person" experienced at age 55 in each year under the existing 
                  social security programs. 
             2) In SSA and PV calculations, we tentatively assume that their values at age 69 are the same as those at age 68, because we do not calculate SSW beyond 69.
             3) In OV calculations, we tentatively assume that the indirect utility is maximized at age 69, because it keeps rising even beyond age 69.
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(S.E.) (0.019) (0.030) (0.026) (0.042) (0.010) (0.008)
 Adj. R








(S.E.) (0.009) (0.008)  (0.008)
  (0.015) (0.003) (0.003)
 Adj. R








(S.E.) (0.007) (0.017) (0.015)
  (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
 Adj. R
2 0.906 0.969 0.515 0.908 0.968 0.324
SSW 0.011 -0.010
**  -0.010
**  -0.002 -0.004
**  -0.002
** 
(S.E.) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
 Adj. R
2 -0.002 0.978 0.630 0.067 0.970 0.301
No. of observations 120 120 105 120 120 105
(Notes) 1) The dependent variable is the level of employee-based LFP rate in Models 1 and 2, and its five-year difference in Model 3.
             2) All models include real GDP per capita, the share in manufacturing, and the share of firms which have mandatory
                  retirement age of 60 or above as covariates.
             3) The estimation period is 1968-2007 for Models 1 and 2 and 1973-2007 for Model 3.
             4) Incentive measures are expressed in terms of 1 million yen.
             5) Italic numbers are inconsistent with prediction and/or insignificant at the 10 percent significance.
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Figure 3. The impact of social security reforms 
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(Note) “Without reform since 2004” curve is omitted because of its negligible impact. 
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Table 4. The estimated impact of social security reforms on elderly labor force
  (annual average for 1985-2007, in thousands)
1985 1989 1994 2000 2004
Males-Model 2
       Labor force per year  6,717 6,697 6,484 6,657 6,679 6,663 6,693
       Difference from baseline ᇞ 214 ᇞ 40 ᇞ 18 ᇞ 34 ᇞ 4
   [3.3] [0.6] [0.3] [0.5] [0.1]
Males-Model 3
       Labor force per year  6,717 6,678 6,591 6,640 6,650 6,642 6,673
       Difference from baseline ᇞ 87 ᇞ 58 ᇞ 48 ᇞ 55 ᇞ 24
   [1.3] [0.9] [0.7] [0.8] [0.4]
Females-Model 2
       Labor force per year  3,947 3,941 3,852 3,826 3,875 3,914 3,940
       Difference from baseline ᇞ 89 ᇞ 115 ᇞ 65 ᇞ 27 ᇞ 1
 [2.3] [3.0] [1.7] [0.7] [0.0]
Females-Model 3
       Labor force per year  3,947 4,114 4,089 4,086 4,095 4,104 4,114
       Difference from baseline ᇞ 25 ᇞ 28 ᇞ 19 ᇞ 10 ᇞ 0
 [0.6] [0.7] [0.5] [0.2] [0.0]
1985 1989 1994 2000 2004
Males-Model 2
       Labor force per year  6,717 6,717 6,199 6,504 6,620 6,677 6,713
       Difference from baseline ᇞ 518 ᇞ 214 ᇞ 97 ᇞ 40 ᇞ 5
                  [percent] [8.4] [3.4] [1.6] [0.6] [0.1]
Males-Model 3  
       Labor force per year  6,717 6,716 6,557 6,619 6,656 6,686 6,712
       Difference from baseline ᇞ 159 ᇞ 98 ᇞ 61 ᇞ 31 ᇞ 5
                  [percent] [2.6] [1.6] [1.0] [0.5] [0.1]
Females-Model 2
       Labor force per year  3,947 3,948 3,707 3,822 3,896 3,940 3,947
       Difference from baseline ᇞ 241 ᇞ 126 ᇞ 52 ᇞ 8 ᇞ 1
                  [percent] [6.5] [3.4] [1.4] [0.2] [0.0]
Females-Model 3
       Labor force per year  3,947 4,114 4,084 4,094 4,103 4,112 4,114
       Difference from baseline ᇞ 30 ᇞ 20 ᇞ 11 ᇞ 2 ᇞ 0
                  [percent] [0.7] [0.5] [0.3] [0.1] [0.0]
(Note) The figures in [     ] is a percetage of the level of "Without reform since 1985" case.
Based on OV
Based on SSW Without reform since: Actual Baseline 
Actual Baseline  Without reform since:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 